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Abstract 
Much evidence suggests that people are concerned with their relative consumption, i.e., their 
consumption in relation to the consumption of others. Yet, the social costs of conspicuous 
consumption have so far played little (or no) role in savings-based indicators of sustainable 
development. The present paper examines the implications of such behavior for measures of 
sustainable development by deriving analogues to genuine saving when people are concerned 
with their relative consumption. Unless the resource allocation is a social optimum, an 
indicator of positional externalities must be added to genuine saving to arrive at the proper 
measure of intertemporal welfare change. A numerical example based on U.S. and Swedish 
data suggests that conventional measures of genuine saving (which do not reflect conspicuous 
consumption) are likely to largely overestimate this welfare change. We also show how 
relative consumption concerns affect the way public investment ought to be reflected in 
genuine saving. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of genuine saving has gained much attention in literature on welfare 
measurement in dynamic economies. Genuine saving is an indicator of comprehensive net 
investment in the sense of summarizing the value of all capital formation undertaken by 
society over a time period. Earlier research shows that the genuine saving constitutes an exact 
measure of welfare change over a short time interval if the resource allocation is first best.1 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
genuine saving has also become an indicator of sustainable development. The World 
Commission defines the development to be sustainable if it meets “the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Our 
Common Future, 1987, page 54). One possible interpretation (discussed by, e.g., Arrow et al., 
2003) is that sustainable development requires welfare to be non-declining, meaning that 
genuine saving becomes an exact indicator of sustainable development over a short time 
interval. Another is that the instantaneous utility must not exceed its maximum sustainable 
level, on the basis of which Pezzey (2004) shows that non-positive genuine saving constitutes 
an indicator of unsustainable development (although positive genuine saving does not 
necessarily imply that development is sustainable). In either case, genuine saving gives 
information of clear practical relevance for economic welfare.2 
Yet, the literature dealing with genuine saving has so far focused on traditional 
neoclassical textbook models, where people derive utility solely from their own absolute 
consumption of goods and services (broadly defined). As such, it neglects the possibility 
discussed in the behavioral economics literature that people also enjoy consuming more, and 
dislike consuming less than others – an idea that appeared rather obvious to many leading 
economists of the past such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, 
                                                          
1 The seminal contributions are Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and Hamilton (1994, 1996). See also Hamilton 
(2010) for a recent overview of the literature and van der Ploeg (2010) for a political economy analysis of 
genuine saving. Some other extensions beyond the standard model are found in Aronsson, Cialani, and Löfgren 
(2012) and Li and Löfgren (2012). The former derives a second-best analogue to genuine saving in a 
representative agent model with distortionary taxes and public debt, and the latter addresses genuine saving 
when growth is stochastic. See also the interesting, recent empirical application by Greasley et al. (2014), who 
test the welfare significance of genuine saving based on historical data from Britain.  
2 This is further emphasized by the attention paid to genuine saving by the World Bank, which regularly 
publishes estimates of genuine saving for a large number of countries.  
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Thorstein Veblen and Arthur Pigou, before it became unfashionable in the beginning of the 
20th century. 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine how relative consumption concerns, 
through a preference for “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses,” affect the principles for measuring 
welfare change. It will then present a correspondingly adjusted measure of genuine saving. 
Arguably, such a study is relevant for several reasons. First, there is now a large body of 
empirical evidence showing that people are concerned with their relative consumption, i.e., 
their consumption compared with that of referent others (and not just their absolute 
consumption as in standard economic models).3 Several studies find that increased relative 
consumption has a strong effect on individual well-being: questionnaire-experimental 
research often concludes that 30-50 percent of an individual’s utility gain from increased 
consumption may actually be due to increased relative consumption (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005; 
Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). Similarly, happiness-based studies 
typically find that a large (or even dominating) share of consumption-induced well-being in 
industrialized countries is due to relative effects (e.g., Luttmer, 2005; Easterlin, 2001; 
Easterlin et al., 2010). In turn, this may distort the incentives underlying capital formation. 
Second, based on the estimates referred to above, wasteful conspicuous consumption is likely 
to result in significant welfare costs, which – if not properly internalized – change the 
principles for calculating welfare change-equivalent measures of saving. Indeed, we show that 
the more positional people are on average, the more conventional models of genuine saving 
(where people are assumed to have standard utility functions) will overestimate the true 
welfare change. Third, recent literature shows that optimal policy rules for public expenditure 
are modified in response to relative consumption concerns,4 suggesting that such concerns 
may also affect the value of public investment in the context of genuine saving. This will be 
further discussed below. 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Easterlin (2001), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), Clark and Senik 
(2010), and Corazzini, Esposito, and Majorano (2012). See also Fliessbach et al. (2007) and Dohmen et al. 
(2011) for evidence based on brain science and Rayo and Becker (2007) for an evolutionary approach. 
4 See Ng (1987), Brekke and Howarth (2002), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, forthcoming), and 
Wendner and Goulder (2008), who analyze different aspects of public good provision in economies where 
people are concerned with their relative consumption. 
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We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where each consumer derives utility 
from his/her own consumption and use of leisure, respectively, and from his/her relative 
consumption compared with a reference consumption level (reflecting other people’s 
consumption). In the benchmark model, the relative consumption comparisons are of the 
keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type, meaning that each individual compares his/her current 
consumption with the current consumption of referent others, which is the case that best 
corresponds to the empirical evidence discussed above. However, we will also – although 
briefly – touch upon catching-up-with-the-Joneses comparisons, where the reference measure 
refers to other people’s past consumption, and argue that the associated externalities affect the 
welfare change measure in the same general way as the externalities following from keeping-
up-with-the-Joneses types of comparisons. 
Our main contribution is that we show how positional concerns influence the way welfare-
change equivalent savings ought to be measured. We distinguish between a social optimum 
where all externalities are internalized, and unregulated market economies without externality 
correction. We also distinguish between first-best and second-best social optima by extending 
the benchmark model to allow for asymmetric information between the consumers and the 
social planner (or government). Furthermore, by using insights developed in the literature on 
tax and other policy responses to relative consumption concerns, we are also able to relate 
genuine saving to empirical measures of “degrees of positionality,” i.e., the extent to which 
relative consumption is important for individual well-being. 
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Aronsson and Löfgren (2008). They consider the 
problem of calculating an analogue to Weitzman’s (1976) welfare-equivalent net national 
product in an economy where the consumers are characterized by habit formation. Their 
results show that if the habits are fully internalized through consumer choices, habit formation 
does not change the basic principles for measuring welfare (except that the individual’s own 
past consumption affects his/her current instantaneous utility). However, with external habit 
formation, i.e., if the habits partly reflect other people’s past consumption, the present value 
of this marginal externality affects the welfare measure through an addition to the 
comprehensive net national product. Our study differs from Aronsson and Löfgren (2008) in 
at least four distinct ways: we (i) consider measures of genuine saving (or analogues thereof) 
instead of net national product measures, (ii) focus attention on the empirically well-
established keeping-up-with-Joneses type of comparison, (iii) allow for redistributive aspects 
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by considering a case where agents differ in productivity, and (iv) introduce public 
investments into the study of welfare change-equivalent savings. 
The paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we present the benchmark model where 
each individual derives utility from consuming more than other people. We also present 
useful indicators of the extent to which relative consumption matters for individual well-
being. Following earlier literature on genuine saving, we assume in the benchmark model that 
individuals are identical. In Section 3, we use the benchmark model to analyze economy-wide 
measures of welfare change. Sections 4 and 5 present two extensions by addressing catching-
up-with-the-Joneses comparisons and public investments, respectively. Section 6 examines a 
more general model with two ability types that differ in productivity, where productivity is 
private information not observable to the social planner. Such a model allows us to extend the 
welfare analysis to a second-best model that includes both redistribution and externality 
correction subject to an incentive constraint. Section 7 presents a numerical example based on 
data for Sweden and the U.S. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Benchmark Model and Equilibrium 
Consider an economy with a constant population comprising identical individuals, whose 
number is normalized to one.5 The assumption of identical individuals is made for purposes of 
simplification; all qualitative results that we derive for this representative agent model would 
carry over in a natural way to a framework with heterogeneous consumers, as long as the 
redistribution policy can be implemented through lump-sum taxation. 
Let c denote private consumption and z leisure. In a way similar to the models analyzed in 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010), the instantaneous utility function faced by 
the representative individual takes the form 
 ( , , ) ( , , )t t t t t t tU u c z c z cu= ∆ = .                   (1) 
In equation (1), the variable t t tc c∆ = −  denotes the relative consumption of the individual 
and is defined as the difference between the individual’s own consumption and a reference 
                                                          
5 To be able to focus on the implications of relative consumption concerns in a simple way, we abstract from 
population growth. Genuine saving under population growth is addressed by Pezzey (2004). See also Asheim 
(2004). 
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measure, tc .
6 Each individual behaves atomistically and treats tc  as exogenous. The 
assumption that the individual’s relative consumption reflects a difference comparison is 
made for technical convenience: all qualitative results derived below will also follow – yet 
with slightly more complex mathematical expressions – if the difference comparison is 
replaced with a ratio comparison (in which the relative consumption would become /t tc c ). 
The function ( )u ⋅  defines the instantaneous utility in terms of the individual’s absolute 
consumption and use of leisure, respectively, as well as in terms of the individual’s relative 
consumption compared with others, while the function ( )u ⋅  is a reduced form used in some of 
the calculations below. We assume that the function ( )u ⋅  is increasing in each argument and 
strictly concave, implying that ( )u ⋅  is increasing in its first two arguments and decreasing in 
the third. To be more specific, following equation (1) the relationships between the functions 
( )u ⋅  and ( )u ⋅  are c cu uu ∆= + , z zuu =  and c uu ∆= − , where subscripts denote partial 
derivatives. 
We follow Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and define the “degree of positionality” as a 
measure of the extent to which relative consumption matters for individual utility compared 
with absolute consumption. To be more specific, the degree of positionality measures the 
share of the overall instantaneous utility gain from increased consumption that is due to 
increased relative consumption. By using the function ( )u ⋅ , which distinguishes between 
absolute and relative consumption, the degree of positionality at time t can be written as 
 ( , , ) (0,1)
( , , ) ( , , )
t t t
t
c t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z
α ∆
∆
∆
= ∈
∆ + ∆
 for all t.                  (2) 
Therefore, 1 tα−  measures the degree of non-positionality, i.e. the extent to which the 
instantaneous utility gain of increased consumption is due to increased absolute consumption 
– an entity that is always set to unity in standard economic models. As indicated in the 
introduction, substantial empirical evidence suggests that the degree of positionality on 
average is in the interval 0.3-0.8 for income (which is interpretable as a proxy for overall 
consumption) in industrialized countries, while it may be even higher for certain visible goods 
such as houses and cars. 
                                                          
6 Note also that leisure is assumed to be completely non-positional. This is of course questionable, yet the limited 
empirical evidence available suggests that private consumption or income is much more positional than leisure 
(Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). 
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The objective faced by each consumer is the present value of future utility. If expressed in 
terms of the function ( )u ⋅ , the intertemporal objective function can then be written as (if 
measured at time 0) 
 
0 0
( , , )t tt t t tU e dt c z c e dt
θ θu
∞ ∞
− −=∫ ∫ ,                   (3) 
where θ  is the utility discount rate. 
The usefulness of genuine saving as a measure of welfare change does not in any way 
depend on the number of capital stocks in the economy. Therefore, to simplify the model as 
much as possible we refrain from considering other types of capital than physical capital. In 
Section 5, we extend the model by incorporating public investment to show how the treatment 
of such investment in genuine saving reflects the policy rule for provision of the public good.  
Let l  denote the hours of work, defined by a time endowment, l , less the time spent on 
leisure, and k  denote the physical capital stock. Output is produced by a constant returns to 
scale technology with production function ( , )f l k , which is such that 0lf > , 0kf > , 0llf <  
and 0kkf ≤ .
7 We suppress depreciation of physical capital, as it is of no concern in our 
context. This means that ( )f ⋅  is interpretable as net output (or that the depreciation rate is 
zero). The net investment at time t is then written in terms of the resource constraint as 
 ( , )t t t tk f l k c= − ,                    (4) 
where the initial (time zero) capital stock, 0k , is fixed and lim 0t tk→∞ ≥ . 
The social decision problem is to choose tc  and tl  for all t to maximize the present value 
of future utility given in equation (3), subject to the resource constraint in equation (4), the 
initial capital stock, and the terminal condition. The present value Hamiltonian of this 
problem is given by (if written in terms of the utility formulation ( )u ⋅  in equation (1)) 
 ( , , ) [ ( , ) ]p t pt t t t t t t tH c z c e f l k c
θu l−= + − ,                   (5) 
where l  denotes the costate variable attached to the capital stock and superscript p denotes 
present value. Note also that we are considering a representative-agent economy, where 
t tc c= . In addition to equation (4) and the initial condition, the social first-order conditions 
include 
                                                          
7 Note that the possibility of 0kkf =  means that the model is consistent with an A-K structure, such that the 
economy grows at a constant rate in the steady state. 
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 [ ( , , ) ( , , )] t pc t t t c t t t tc z c c z c e
θu u l−+ =                  (6a) 
 ( , , ) ( , )t pz t t t t l t tc z c e f l k
θu l− =                  (6b) 
 ( , )
p
p pt
t t k t t
t
H f l k
k
l l
∂
= − = −
∂
 ,                 (6c) 
where subscripts attached to the instantaneous utility and production functions denote partial 
derivatives. For further use, we also assume that the transversality conditions 
lim 0pt tl→∞ ≥   ( 0=  if lim 0t tk→∞ > )                 (6d) 
lim 0pt tH→∞ =                   (6e) 
are fulfilled.8 Note that the left-hand side of equation (6a) reflects the social marginal utility 
of consumption, c c cuu u+ = , since the social planner recognizes that relative consumption is 
social waste. 
In an unregulated economy where the consumption externality is uninternalized, the social 
first-order condition for private consumption given by equation (6a) is not satisfied. Instead of 
introducing the decision problems faced by consumers and firms in the unregulated economy 
and then characterizing the general equilibrium, we just note that the outcome of such an 
economy would be equivalent to the special case of the model set out above where the social 
planner (erroneously) treats tc  as exogenous for all t. The first-order condition for 
consumption would then change to 
 ( , , ) t pc t t t tc z c e
θu l− = ,                    (7) 
whereas the first-order condition for work hours and equation of motion for the costate 
variable remain as in equations (6b) and (6c), respectively. 
 
3. Measuring Welfare Change in the Benchmark Model 
This section presents measures of welfare change based on the benchmark model set out 
above. We begin by considering welfare change measures under first-best conditions in 
Subsection 3.1 and continue with the unregulated economy in Subsection 3.2. Some 
extensions of the benchmark model are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
3.1 First-Best Resource Allocation 
                                                          
8 For a more rigorous analysis of transversality conditions in optimal control theory, see Michel (1982) and 
Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987). 
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As a point of departure, consider first the problem of measuring welfare change along the 
first-best optimal path that obeys equations (6a)-(6c), where the externalities associated with 
relative consumption concerns are fully internalized. This constitutes a natural reference case, 
although it is presumably not very realistic. We use the superscript * to denote the socially 
optimal resource allocation, such that 
{ }* * * ,*, , , pt t t tc l k tl ∀  
satisfy equations (4) and (6) along with the initial and terminal conditions for the capital 
stock, and then define the corresponding optimal value function at time t as follows: 
 * * * * ( )( , , ) s tt s s s
t
V c z c e dsθu
∞
− −= ∫ .                   (8) 
The welfare change over the short time interval ( , )t t dt+  is given by the time derivative of 
equation (8), i.e., 
 
*
* * * * *( , , )t t t t t t
dV
V V c z c
dt
θ u≡ = − .                   (9) 
Defining genuine saving at any time t as t tkl  , where 
p t
t t e
θl l=  denotes the current value 
shadow price of physical capital, our first result is summarized as follows: 
 
Observation 1. In a first-best optimum, genuine saving constitutes an exact measure of 
welfare change such that 
 * * *t t tV kl=  .                   (10) 
 
Observation 1 is a standard result, which reproduces the welfare change-equivalence property 
of genuine saving in the context of the benchmark model. The left-hand side of equation (10) 
is the welfare change over the short time interval ( , )t t dt+ , while the right-hand side is 
interpretable as the genuine saving for the model set out above measured in units of utility at 
the first-best social optimum. While our model for simplicity only contains a one-dimensional 
capital concept (or state variable), the physical capital stock, a generalization to several capital 
stocks is straightforward: the right-hand side of equation (10) would then simply be the sum 
of changes in the value of all relevant capital stocks (see also Section 5 below). 
 
3.2 Unregulated Economy 
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Here we analyze the probably more realistic case where the externalities associated with 
relative consumption concerns are not internalized, implying that the first-order condition for 
private consumption is given by equation (7) instead of equation (6a), and that equation (10) 
is no longer valid. Let 
 { }0 0 ,0, , pt t tc k tl ∀  
denote the resource allocation in the unregulated economy, and let the corresponding value 
function at time t be given by 
 0 0 0 0 ( )( , , ) s tt s s s
t
V c z c e dsθu
∞
− −= ∫ .                 (11) 
Also, let ( , )t k t tr f l k=  denote the interest rate at time t, and 
0s
s t t
R r dt t− = ∫  denote the sum of 
interest rates from t to s (where s t> ). Now, by using 
 0 0 0 0 0( , , )t t t t tV V c z cθ u= − ,                  (12) 
we can derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 1. In an unregulated economy with externalities caused by relative consumption 
concerns, the measure of welfare change takes the form 
 0 0 0 0 0exp( )t t t s s t s
t
V k R c dsl α
∞
−
 
= − − 
 
∫                   (13) 
where 
0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0
( , , )
( , , ) ( , , )
t t t
t
c t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z
α ∆
∆
∆
=
∆ + ∆
. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The right-hand side of equation (13) is written as the product of the real welfare change (the 
expression within square brackets) and the marginal utility of consumption. Proposition 1 
implies that the conventional measure of genuine saving, t tkl  , does not generally constitute 
an exact measure of welfare change in an unregulated economy.9 The second term on the 
                                                          
9 The insight that externalities may change the principles of measuring welfare and welfare change is, of course, 
not new. Earlier research on green national accounting shows that technological change and environmental 
externalities add additional components to measures of welfare and welfare change in unregulated economies 
(see Aronsson, Löfgren and Backlund, 2004, and Aronsson and Löfgren, 2010, as well as references therein). 
The novelties of the present paper are that it (i) shows how conspicuous consumption modifies the principles of 
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right-hand side is the value of the marginal externality and is given by a weighted sum of 
discounted future changes in the reference consumption, where the instantaneous weights are 
defined by the degrees of positionality along the economy’s equilibrium path. This component 
is forward looking, since the welfare function at any time t is intertemporal and reflects future 
utility.  
Note that in the economy with identical individuals analyzed so far, c  is always equal to c, 
implying that their growth rates will also be the same. Thus, in a growing economy, the 
second term on the right-hand side of equation (13) will be negative and genuine saving will 
overestimate the welfare change. Also, the more positional the consumers are, i.e., the larger 
the α , the greater the discrepancy between the conventional measure of genuine saving and 
the welfare change, ceteris paribus. Therefore, empirical estimates of the degree of 
positionality, along with estimates of changes in the average consumption, are important for 
calculating the second term on the right-hand side of equation (13).  
What is the remaining informational content of t tkl  ? If we erroneously were to apply the 
genuine saving formula given by equation (10) in an unregulated economy, it follows that 
t tkl   does not constitute an indicator of local sustainable development as it does not measure 
the change in welfare over the time interval ( , )t t dt+ . In other words, 0t tkl >  does not 
indicate a welfare improvement. Similarly, 0t tkl <  does not in general imply a welfare 
decline. However, if consumption increases along the equilibrium path, t tkl   can still be used 
for a one-sided test of local unsustainable development, since 0t tkl <  then implies that the 
right-hand side of equation (13) is negative. 
 
4 Adding a Catching-up-with-the-Joneses Mechanism 
So far, we have assumed that the relative consumption comparisons are atemporal: each 
individual compares his/her current consumption with other people’s current consumption. 
Although a great deal of empirical evidence on relative consumption concerns is interpretable 
as mainly reflecting such comparisons, it is easy to argue that intertemporal consumption 
comparisons may also be relevant to consider. For example, Senik (2010) presents empirical 
evidence consistent with such catching-up-with-the-Joneses comparisons by showing that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
measuring welfare-equivalent saving (an issue that to our knowledge has never been addressed) and (ii) by 
relating the welfare change measure to empirical measures of positional concerns. 
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individual well-being is higher if the individual’s standard of living exceeds that of his/her 
parents 15 years earlier, ceteris paribus. Such comparisons are also consistent with the 
empirical pattern of various financial puzzles (Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 
1999; and Díaz et al., 2003). It is therefore clearly interesting to investigate whether the 
qualitative results and interpretations presented in the previous section above carry over to a 
framework where the individual also derives utility from comparisons with other people’s 
past consumption. As will be shown, they essentially do. 
There are at least two ways of modeling such intertemporal consumption comparisons. 
One is to add a stock reflecting a weighted average of other people’s past consumption over 
the entire history of the model, as Aronsson and Löfgren (2008) did in their study on the 
comprehensive net national product under external habit formation. Another way is to assume 
that the individual directly derives utility from comparing his/her time t consumption with 
others’ consumption at time t ε−  (and possibly other points in time as well). We use the latter 
approach as it requires less modifications of the model set out above. The instantaneous utility 
at time t is then rewritten to read 
 ( , , , ) ( , , , )t t t t t t t t tU u c z c z c c εδ u −= ∆ = ,                 (14) 
where t t tc c εδ −= −  denotes the individual’s relative consumption compared with others’ past 
consumption. Thus, the instantaneous utility is no longer time separable. All other aspects of 
the model remain as above. 
We can then distinguish between the degree of atemporal positionality (which is analogous 
to the positionality concept discussed above) and the degree of intertemporal positionality.10 
By using equation (14), these two measures are summarized as 
 ( , , , ) (0,1)
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
t t t t
t
c t t t t t t t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z u c zδ
δ
α
δ δ δ
∆
∆
∆
= ∈
∆ + ∆ + ∆
               (15) 
 ( , , , ) (0,1)
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )
t t t t
t
c t t t t t t t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z u c z
δ
δ
δ
β
δ δ δ∆
∆
= ∈
∆ + ∆ + ∆
.               (16) 
As before, tα  denotes the degree of atemporal positionality (with the same interpretation as 
equation (2) above) and tβ  the degree of intertemporal positionality at time t. The latter 
positionality concept measures the fraction of the utility gain of an additional dollar spent on 
                                                          
10 This distinction originates from Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014), who analyze the simultaneous 
implications of keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-the-Joneses types of comparisons for optimal 
taxation in an OLG model. 
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consumption that is due to increased relative consumption compared with other people’s past 
consumption. 
Consider first the socially optimal resource allocation. Here, since the reference 
consumption measure on which the intertemporal consumption comparison is based enters the 
instantaneous utility function with a time lag, equation (6a) is replaced with 
 ( )[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )] ( , , , ) 0
t t t
t t p
c t t t t c t t t t c t t t t tc z c c c z c c e c z c c e
θ θ ε
ε ε ε ε εu u u l
− +
− − + + ++ + − = ,       (17) 
where the third term on the right-hand side is due to the delayed response mechanism caused 
by intertemporal consumption comparisons. The other first-order conditions remain as in 
equations (6b) and (6c). By using the same procedure as above, it is straightforward to show 
that equation (10) in Observation 1 still applies, since there are no uninternalized externalities 
that affect the welfare change measure, i.e., * * *t t tV kl=  . 
In the unregulated economy, the first-order conditions are also in this case given by 
equations (6b), (6c), and (7), and we have the following analogue to Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 2. In an unregulated economy, where the externalities associated with relative 
consumption concerns are driven by both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses and catching-up-with-
the-Joneses comparisons, the measure of welfare change takes the form 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0exp( ) exp( )t t t s s t s s s t s
t t
V k R c ds R c dsε εl α β
∞ ∞
− + + −
 
= − − − − 
 
∫ ∫   .               (18) 
 
The interpretation of equation (18) is analogous to that of equation (13), with the only 
modification that the value of the marginal externality is divided in two parts in equation (18). 
The reason is, of course, that equation (18) is based on the assumption that there are two 
mechanisms (a keeping-up and a catching-up mechanism) behind the relative consumption 
comparisons. We can see that externalities associated with the keeping-up and catching-up 
comparisons affect the welfare change measure in the same general way. Therefore, the 
interpretations of Proposition 1 essentially carry over to Proposition 2. While this conclusion 
is interesting per se, it also suggests that we may skip the catching-up component in what 
follows in order to keep the model as simple and transparent as possible. 
 
5. Public Investments 
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This section extends the benchmark model by analyzing the role of public investments. 
The implications of relative consumption concerns for the optimal provision of public goods 
have been addressed in several studies (e.g., Ng, 1987; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 
2008, forthcoming). Relative concerns for private consumption affect the optimal policy rule 
for public good provision via two channels: (1) an incentive to internalize positional 
externalities through increased public provision (which reduces the private consumption) and 
(2) an (indirect) incentive to reduce the public provision as relative consumption concerns 
lower the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for public goods, ceteris paribus. As such, 
whether or not positional preferences for private consumption influence the policy rule for a 
public good largely depends on the preference elicitation format. In turn, this has a direct 
bearing on the way public investment ought to be reflected in the context of genuine saving, 
which motivates the following extension. 
We will, consequently, add a public good of stock character to the instantaneous utility, 
which means that equation (1) changes to 
 ( , , , ) ( , , , )t t t t t t t t tU u c z g c z g cu= ∆ = ,                 (19) 
where tg  denotes the level of the public good at time t (e.g., the state of the natural 
environment). The public good accumulates through the following differential equation:11 
t t tg q gg= −  ,                (20) 
where tq  denotes the flow expenditure directed toward the public good at time t, i.e., the 
instantaneous contribution, and g  denotes the rate of depreciation. We also impose the initial 
condition that 0g  is fixed and the terminal condition lim 0t tg→∞ ≥ . Finally, since part of 
output is used for contributions to the public good, the resource constraint slightly changes 
such that 
 ( , )t t t t tk f l k c qρ= − − ,                  (21) 
where ρ  is interpretable as the (fixed) marginal rate of transformation between the public 
good and the private consumption good. 
                                                          
11 Since the public good is interpretable in terms of environmental quality, a possible (and realistic) extension of 
equation (20) would be to assume that increased output leads to lower environmental quality (instead of just 
assuming a natural rate of depreciation). Yet, we refrain from this extension here as it is not important for the 
qualitative results derived below. 
15 
 
These extensions mean that we have added the control variable q  and the state variable g  
to the benchmark model; otherwise, the model is the same as in Section 2. Thus, the social 
decision problem is to choose tc , tl , and tq  for all t to maximize the present value of future 
utility, 
 
0 0
( , , , )t tt t t t tU e dt c z g c e dt
θ θu
∞ ∞
− −=∫ ∫ , 
subject to equations (20) and (21) along with initial and terminal conditions. The present 
value Hamiltonian can then be written as  
 ( , , , ) [ ( , ) ] [ ]p t p pt t t t t t t t t t t t tH c z g c e f l k q c q g
θu l ρ µ g−= + − − + − .             (22) 
The variable ptµ  denotes the present value shadow price of the public good at time t, and its 
current value counterpart is given by p tt t e
θµ µ= . Note that equations (6a)-(6e), if written in 
terms of the instantaneous utility function examined here (i.e., equation [19]), are necessary 
conditions also in this extended model. In addition to (the modified) equations (6), the first-
order conditions for a social optimum also include an efficiency condition for q , an equation 
of motion for pµ , and an additional transversality condition, i.e., 
 p pt tl ρ µ=                  (23a) 
 ( , , , )
p
p t pt
t g t t t t t
t
H
c z g c e
g
θµ u µ g−
∂
= − = − +
∂
               (23b) 
lim 0pt tµ→∞ ≥  ( 0=  if lim 0t tg→∞ > ).               (23c) 
Equations (6a)-(6e) and (23) characterize the social optimum. As in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2, 
if the positional externality has not become internalized, equation (6a) should be replaced 
with equation (7) (again modified to reflect the instantaneous utility function [19] that 
contains the public good). For further use, let us also solve the differential equation (23b) 
forward subject to the transversality condition (23c),12 which gives 
 (s t)( , , , )p st g s s s s
t
c z g c e e dsθ gµ u
∞
− − −= ∫ .                 (24) 
We are now ready to present the main results. As before, to separate the social optimum 
from an allocation with uninternalized positional externalities, we use superscript * to denote 
the socially optimal resource allocation and superscript 0 to denote the unregulated economy. 
                                                          
12 We assume that lim 0t tg→∞ > . 
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The value function (social welfare function) at any time t will be defined in the same way as 
above, i.e., 
( )( , , , ) s tt s s s s
t
V c z g c e dsθu
∞
− −= ∫ . 
Then, by recognizing that genuine saving now reads t t t tk gl µ+   (since the capital concept is 
two-dimensional here), we can use the same procedure as in Observation 1 and Proposition 1 
to derive an analogue to equation (10) as follows: 
 * * * *t t t tV k gl ρ = + 
  ,                (25a) 
and a corresponding analogue to equation (13): 
 0 0 0 0 0 0exp( )t t t t s s t s
t
V k g R c dsl ρ α
∞
−
 
= + − − 
 
∫  .              (25b) 
Except for the public investment component, equations (25a) and (25b) are interpretable in 
exactly the same way as their counterparts in the simpler benchmark model, i.e., equations 
(10) and (13).13 
Equations (25a) and (25b) together imply the following treatment of public investment: 
 
Proposition 3. Irrespective of whether the resource allocation is first best or represented by 
an unregulated equilibrium, the accounting price of public investment is given by the 
marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the private consumption good, 
ρ . 
 
Proposition 3 has a strong implication, as it means that the valuation of public investment 
might be based on observables and that the same valuation procedure applies in a social 
optimum and a distorted market economy. Although convenient, this result may seem 
surprising at first sight. Yet, note that the information content in ρ  differs between the two 
regimes due to differences in the underlying policy rules for public provision. To see this 
more clearly, let 
                                                          
13 If we extend the model by allowing ρ  to vary over time, e.g., due to disembodied technological change, an 
additional (forward-looking) term representing the marginal value of this technological change must be added to 
equations (25a) and (25b). 
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 g ggc
c c
u
MRS
u u
u
u ∆
= =
+
 
denote the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption 
measured with the reference consumption, c , held constant, and 
 g ggc
c c c
u
CMRS
u
u
u u
= =
+
 
denote the corresponding marginal rate of substitution measured with the relative 
consumption, ∆ , held constant. Therefore, gcMRS refers to a conventional marginal 
willingness to pay measure with other people’s consumption held constant. This means that 
an increase in the public good will not only imply reduced (absolute) consumption, the 
individual will also take into account the fact that his/her relative consumption decreases. 
gcCMRS , on the other hand, reflects each respondent’s marginal willingness to pay for the 
public good conditional on the fact that other people have to pay the same amount, implying 
that relative consumption is held fixed. Thus, in this case there is no additional cost in terms 
of reduced relative consumption, implying that under relative consumption concerns 
gcCMRS will exceed gcMRS . Indeed, it is straightforward to show that 
/ (1 )gc gcCMRS MRS α= − .  
By using equations (6a), (23a), and (24), the policy rule for public provision in the first-
best optimum is then given by 
 
**
,( ( )) ( ( ))*
,* *1
s t s ts gcR s t R s tt
s gc
t st t
MRS
CMRS e ds e dsg g
µ
ρ
l α
− −
∞ ∞
− + − − + −= = =
−∫ ∫ ,             (26a) 
while the corresponding policy rule implicit in the unregulated economy, based on equations 
(7), (23a), and (24), becomes 
 
0
( ( ))0
,0
s tR s tt
s gc
t t
MRS e dsg
µ
ρ
l
−
∞
− + −= =∫ .               (26b) 
Equations (26a) and (26b) are different variants of the Samuelson condition for a state 
variable public good. In a social optimum, where all positional externalities are internalized, 
the social marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption is 
given by gcCMRS , which recognizes that relative consumption is pure waste. In the 
unregulated economy, on the other hand, agents behave as if others’ consumption, c , is 
exogenous, meaning that the marginal rate of substitution implicit in the first-order conditions 
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is given by gcMRS . In either case, however, it is optimal to equate the weighted sum of 
marginal rates of substitution with the marginal rate of transformation, which explains 
Proposition 3. There is an important practical implication here: regardless of whether we are 
in a first-best economy or in an unregulated equilibrium, public investment can be valued by 
the instantaneous marginal cost, such that there is no need to estimate future generations’ 
marginal willingness to pay for current additions to the public good. 
 
6. Heterogeneity, Redistribution Policy and Genuine Saving 
In the preceding sections we have consistently considered a representative-agent economy, 
which is the typical framework used in earlier literature dealing with genuine saving. In this 
section, we extend the analysis to a model where consumers are heterogeneous in terms of 
productivity and productivity is private information. Such an extension is of course not 
without costs in terms of greater complexity and less transparency. However, the benefits are 
also considerable in terms of greater realism. In particular, it acknowledges the fact that there 
is a social value of increased equality, and it also takes into account that redistributive taxes 
are generally distortionary in the sense that they affect people’s incentive to work. This 
framework, which is common in earlier literature on optimal taxation, has recently been used 
to analyze the policy implications of relative consumption concerns. As explained in the 
introduction, such an extension enables us to generalize the study of genuine saving to a 
second-best economy where the social planner redistributes and internalizes externalities 
subject to an incentive constraint.14 
We make two simplifying assumptions. First, we do not consider public investments. Since 
Proposition 3 can be shown to apply also in the model set out below, little additional insight 
would be gained from studying such investments here as well. Second, to avoid unnecessary 
technical complications with many different consumer types, we use the two-type setting 
originally developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). The consumers differ in 
productivity, and the high type (type 2) is more productive (measured in terms of the before-
                                                          
14 To our knowledge, the paper by Aronsson, Cialani, and Löfgren (2012) is the only earlier study dealing with 
genuine saving in a second-best economy with distortionary taxation. Their study is based on a representative-
agent model (and as such does not consider redistribution policy) and assumes that individuals only care about 
their own absolute consumption and use of leisure (meaning that relative consumption is not dealt with at all). 
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tax wage rate) than the low type (type 1).15 The population is constant and normalized to one 
for notational convenience, and there is a constant share, in , of individuals of type i, such that 
1i
i
n =∑ . 
 
6.1 Preferences and Social Decision-Problem 
We also allow for type-specific differences in preferences. The instantaneous utility 
function facing each individual of type i can then be written as 
( , , ) ( , , )i i i i i i i it t t t t t tU u c z c z cu= ∆ = ,                 (27) 
where ci it t tc∆ = −  denotes the relative consumption of type i. The functions ( )
iu ⋅  and ( )iu ⋅  in 
equation (27) have the same general properties as their counterparts in equation (1). Also, and 
similarly to the benchmark model presented in Section 2, the relative consumption concerns 
in equation (27) solely reflect comparisons with other people’s current consumption, i.e., we 
abstract from the catching-up mechanism briefly discussed above. The reference level is 
assumed to be the average consumption in the economy as a whole, 1 1 2 2t t tc n c n c= + .
16 As 
before, each consumer is small relative to the overall economy and hence treats tc  as 
exogenous. 
In a way similar to Sections 2 and 3, it is useful to be able to measure the extent to which 
relative consumption matters for individual utility. By using the function ( )iu ⋅  in equation 
(27), we can define the degree of positionality of type i at time t such that 
 ( , , ) (0,1)
( , , ) ( , , )
i i i i
i t t t
t i i i i i i i i
c t t t t t t
u c z
u c z u c z
α ∆
∆
∆
= ∈
∆ + ∆
 for i=1,2, all t.               (28) 
Therefore, itα  measures the fraction of the utility gain for type i at time t of increased 
consumption that is due to increased relative consumption (compared with the reference 
consumption level). 
                                                          
15 Aronsson (2010) uses a similar two-type model to derive a second-best analogue to the comprehensive net 
national product. However, his study neither addresses the implications of relative consumption concerns nor 
examines genuine saving, which are the main issues here. 
16 This is the most common assumption in the literature dealing with optimal policy responses to relative 
consumption concerns. Although the definition of reference consumption at the individual level (i.e., whether it 
is based on the economy-wide mean value or reflects more narrow social reference groups) matters for public 
policy, it is not equally important here, where the main purpose is to characterize an aggregate measure of social 
savings.  
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Since we assume that all individuals compare their own consumption with the average 
consumption in the economy as a whole, we can define the positional externality in terms of 
the average degree of positionality. The average degree of positionality measured over all 
individuals at time t can be written as (recall that the total population size is normalized to 
unity) 
 1 1 2 2 (0,1)t t tn nα α α= + ∈ ,                  (29) 
which also reflects the sum of the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the positional 
consumption externality measured per unit of consumption. Estimates of tα  can be found in 
empirical literature on relative consumption concerns, as discussed above (see the 
introduction). 
The social objective is assumed to be a general social welfare function 
 ( )1 20
0
, tt tW U U e dt
θω
∞
−= ∫ .                  (30) 
The instantaneous social welfare function, ( )ω ⋅ , is differentiable and increasing in the 
instantaneous individual utilities. The resource constraint can now be written as 
 1 2( , , ) i it t t t tik f k n c= −∑   ,                  (31) 
where i i it tn l=  is interpretable as the aggregate input of type i labor at time t. As before, the 
production function, 1 2( , , )t t tf k  , is characterized by constant returns to scale. 
Following Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), we assume that the social planner (or 
government) can observe labor income and saving at the individual level, while ability is 
private information. We also assume that the social planner wants to redistribute from the 
high type to the low type. To eliminate the incentive for the high type to mimic the low type 
(in order to gain from this redistribution profile), we impose a self-selection constraint such 
that each individual of the high type weakly prefers the allocation intended for his/her type 
over the allocation intended for the low type. Also, to simplify the analysis, we assume that 
the social planner commits to the resource allocation decided at time zero.17 One way to 
rationalize this assumption in our framework is to interpret the model in terms of a continuum 
of perfectly altruistic generations, i.e., dynasties (instead of single consumers with infinite 
                                                          
17 See Brett and Weymark (2008) for an analysis of optimal taxation without commitment based on the self-
selection approach to optimal taxation. 
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lives),18 such that the ability of agents living at any time t is not necessarily observable 
beforehand by the social planner. Therefore, the self-selection constraint is assumed to take 
the form 
 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2ˆ( , , ) ( , , )t t t t t t t t tU c z c c l l c Uu u φ= ≥ − =                  (32) 
for all t. The left-hand side represents the utility of the high type at time t and the right-hand 
side the utility of the mimicker (a high type choosing the same income and saving as the low 
type). The variable 1 21 2 1 2 1 2 1 2/ ( , , ) / ( , , ) ( , , ) 1t t t t t t t t t t t tw w f k f k kφ φ= = = <        denotes the 
relative wage rate at time t, and 1 1t t tl lφ <  is the hours of work the mimicking high type needs 
to supply to reach the same labor income as the (mimicked) low type. 
 
6.2 Second-Best Optimum and Genuine Saving 
The social optimum can be derived by choosing 1tc , 
1
tl , 
2
tc , and 
2
tl  for all t to maximize the 
social welfare function given in equation (30), subject to the resource constraint and self-
selection constraint in equation (31) and (32), respectively, and to that the initial capital stock, 
0k , is fixed and the terminal condition lim 0t tk→∞ ≥ . Also, the social planner recognizes that 
the reference consumption is endogenous and given by 1 1 2 2t t tc n c n c= + .
19 The present value 
Hamiltonian at any time t is given by 
 ( )1 2,p t pt t t t tH U U e kθω l−= +  .                 (33) 
Adding the self-selection constraint gives the present value Lagrangean 
2 2ˆ[ ]p p pt t t t tL H U Uη= + − ,                  (34) 
                                                          
18 We realize that this interpretation is not unproblematic, since each individual in a succession of generations 
faces his/her own objective and constraints; see Michel, Thibault, and Vidal (2006) for a discussion. However, 
our main concern here is to examine the implications of the self-selection constraint for how positional 
externalities ought to be treated in savings-based measures of welfare change. Since the externality is atemporal 
in our model (i.e., a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses externality), the exact way in which successive generations 
interact is of no major importance for the qualitative results. 
19 We will not go into how such an allocation can be implemented by optimal nonlinear taxation. Here, the 
reader is referred to Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010). Other literature on optimal taxation under relative 
consumption concerns includes Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001), 
Ireland (2001), Dupor and Liu (2003), Wendner and Goulder (2008), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2014). 
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where ptη  denotes the present value Lagrange multiplier. If written in terms of the reduced 
form utility formulation ( )iu ⋅  in equation (27), and by using 2 2 1 1ˆ ( , , )t t t t tc l l cu u φ= −  as a short 
notation for the instantaneous utility facing the mimicker at time t, the first-order conditions 
can be written as (in addition to equations [31] and [32] and the initial and terminal conditions 
for the capital stock) 
1
1 2 1 1
1
ˆ 0
p p
t p p
c cU
L Le n n
c c
θω u η u l−∂ ∂= − − + =
∂ ∂
              (35a) 
1
1 2 1 1 1
1 1
ˆ [ ] 0
p
t p p
z zU
L e l n w
l l
θ φω u η u φ l−∂ ∂= − + + + =
∂ ∂
              (35b) 
2
2 2 2 2
2 0
p p
t p p
c cU
L Le n n
c c
θω u η u l−∂ ∂= + − + =
∂ ∂
                              (35c) 
2
2 2 2 1 2 2
2 2
ˆ[ ] 0
p
t p p
z z zU
L e l n w
l l
θ φω u η u u l−∂ ∂= − + − + + =
∂ ∂
              (35d) 
2 1ˆ
p
p p
p z
L r l
k k
φl l η u∂ ∂= − = − −
∂ ∂
 .               (35e) 
The optimal resource allocation also fulfills transversality conditions analogous to equations 
(6d) and (6e). In equations (35), we have suppressed the time indicator to avoid notational 
clutter (since all components refer to the same point in time), and subscripts attached to the 
instantaneous utility functions and social welfare function refer to partial derivatives (as 
before). The factor prices are determined by marginal products, i.e., 11 1 2( , , )w f k=    , 
2
2 1 2( , , )w f k=

  , and 1 2( , , )kr f k=   . 
The final term on the right-hand side of equations (35a) and (35c) reflects the positional 
consumption externality and measures the partial instantaneous welfare effect of increased 
reference consumption times the effect of each type’s consumption on the reference measure. 
This partial welfare effect can be either positive or negative and is given as follows: 
1 2
1 2 2 2
, , , ,ˆt t t tt t
P
t t pt
t c t c t t c t cU U
t
L e e
c
θ θω u ω u η u u− −
∂  = + + − ∂
.                (36) 
Although the first two terms on the right-hand side are negative, since , 0t
i
t cu <  for i=1,2 by 
the assumptions made earlier, the third term (which is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier 
of the self-selection constraint) can be either positive or negative. We will return to equation 
(36) in greater detail below. 
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We are now ready to derive a measure of welfare change for the second-best economy set 
out above. The main differences compared with the model analyzed in Sections 2 and 3 are 
that (i) the individuals differ in productivity and preferences here, meaning also that they may 
differ in terms of relative consumption concerns (see equation [28] above), (ii) the social 
planner has an objective that may necessitate redistribution policy, and (iii) the social planner 
is unable to implement the first-best resource allocation (provided that the self-selection 
constraint binds). Despite these differences, we will also in this case use the superscript * to 
denote social optimum (let be a second-best optimum) such that  
{ }1,* 1,* 2,* 2,* * ,*, , , , , pt t t t t tc l c l k tl ∀  
satisfy equations (6d), (6e), (31), (32), and (35a)-(35e) as well as the initial and terminal 
conditions. The optimal value function at time t (based on the social welfare function) then 
becomes 
 ( )* 1,* 1,* * 2,* 2,* * ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s tt s s s s s s
t
W c z c c z c e dsθω u u
∞
− −= ∫ .                (37) 
We can then derive the following strong result regarding the change in social welfare over 
a short time interval, ( , )t t dt+ : 
 
Proposition 4. If the resource allocation satisfies equations (6d), (6e), (31), and (35a)-(35e), 
and irrespective of whether the self-selection constraint binds, genuine saving constitutes an 
exact measure of social welfare change such that 
 * * *t t tW kl=  ,                   (38) 
where * ,*p tt t e
θl l= . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 4 constitutes a remarkable result. It means that the procedure for measuring 
welfare change in a first-best representative-agent economy (as discussed in Section 3) carries 
over to the second-best economy analyzed here, where the agents differ in productivity 
(which is private information). The only difference is that the shadow price of capital is 
measured in a slightly different way (which is seen by comparing equations [6c] and [35e]). 
The intuition is that the redistribution is optimal given the social welfare function and 
constraints, and the positional externality is internalized. As a consequence, there is no market 
failure or failure to reach the distributional objectives that may cause a discrepancy between 
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the welfare change and the conventional measure of genuine saving.20 This holds true 
irrespective of whether the resource allocation is first best or second best. 
 
6.3 Welfare Change and Positional Externalities 
To be able to focus on the welfare contributions of uninternalized externalities, we model 
the unregulated economy in the same general way as above by assuming that the resource 
allocation is optimal conditional on the level of reference consumption. In the context of the 
present model, this means that the redistribution policy is decided in the same general way as 
before with one exception: the social planner (erroneously) treats tc  as exogenous. A possible 
interpretation is that the income tax system is optimal conditional on tc , i.e., the underlying 
tax policy is chosen as if the consumer preference for relative consumption does not give rise 
to externalities. 
In this case, the social planner’s first-order conditions for 1tl  and 
2
tl  remain as in equation 
(35b) and (35d), respectively, and the equation of motion for the shadow price remains as in 
equation (35e), whereas the first-order conditions for 1tc  and 
2
tc  change to 
1
1 2 1
1
ˆ 0
p
t p p
c cU
L e n
c
θω u η u l−∂ = − − =
∂
               (39a) 
2
2 2 2
2 0
p
t p p
c cU
L e n
c
θω u η u l−∂ = + − =
∂
.               (39b) 
Now, let us return to the partial instantaneous welfare effect of increased reference 
consumption in equation (36). By using i i ic cu uu ∆= +  and 
i i
c uu ∆= −  together with equation 
(28), we have i i ic cu α u= − , which means that equation (36) can be written as 
1 2
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
, , , ,ˆ ˆt t t tt t
P
t t pt
t c t t c t t t c t t c tU U
t
L e e
c
θ θω u α ω u α η u α u α− −
∂  = − − − − ∂
, 
where 2ˆtα  denotes the degree of positionality of the mimicker at time t. Solving equation 
(39a) for 1 1 tcU e
θω u −  and equation (39b) for 2 2 tcU e
θω u − , and substituting into the above 
expression gives 
                                                          
20 Aronsson and Löfgren (1999) show that if the distribution of resources among consumers is not optimal during 
a time interval, the comprehensive net national product may for this reason fail as a welfare-level measure. In 
their study, a first-best resource allocation constitutes the reference case.  
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2 2 1ˆ ˆ
P
p pt
t t t c t t
t
L
c
l α η u α α
∂  = − + − ∂
.                 (40) 
Equation (40) is analogous to a result derived by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) 
and implies that the partial welfare effect of an increase in tc  can be decomposed in two parts. 
The first term on the right-hand side depends on the average degree of positionality and is 
interpretable as the welfare cost of an increase in the positional externality at time t, ceteris 
paribus. This is so because tα  reflects the sum of marginal willingness to pay to avoid the 
externality, measured over all consumers, and the multiplication by ptl  converts this number 
into utility units. The second component in equation (40) depends on the difference in the 
degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low type. Note that this component is 
proportional to the Lagrange multiplier of the selection constraint, which means that it 
vanishes in a first-best setting where the differences in productivity are observed by the social 
planner (in which case the self-selection constraint becomes redundant). If the mimicker is 
more positional than the low type at time t such that 2 1ˆt tα α> , an increase in tc  contributes to 
higher welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraint, in which case the sign of the right-
hand side of equation (40) is ambiguous. In other words, the pure efficiency cost of a higher 
tc  is accompanied by a welfare gain through this relaxation of the self-selection constraint. 
On the other hand, if 2 1ˆt tα α< , i.e., if the low type is more positional than the mimicker, the 
right-hand side of equation (40) is unambiguously negative since an increase in tc  in that case 
contributes to tighten the self-selection constraint. 
To distinguish the resource allocation analyzed here from the second-best optimum in 
Subsection 6.2, we shall once again use the superscript 0 to denote the unregulated economy, 
i.e.,  
{ }1,0 1,0 2,0 2,0 0 ,0, , , , , pt t t t t tc l c l k tl ∀ . 
The corresponding optimal value function becomes 
 ( )0 1,0 1,0 0 2,0 2,0 0 ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s tt s s s s s s
t
W c z c c z c e dsθω u u
∞
− −= ∫ ,                (41) 
which measures the social welfare at time t. 
For notational convenience, define the real welfare effect of an increase in tc  (by dividing 
equation [40] by the shadow price of capital) such that 
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2
2 1ˆ ˆ
p
t c
t t t tp
t
η u
α α α
l
 Λ = − + −  .                 (42) 
We can then derive the following result: 
 
Proposition 5. If the unregulated economy satisfies (6d), (6e), (31), (32), (35b), (35d), (35e), 
(39a), and (39b), the measure of welfare change can be written as 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( )s tt t t s s s
t
W k c e dsθl l
∞
− −= + Λ∫  .                (43) 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 5 shows how the conventional measure of genuine saving should be modified to 
reflect the change in welfare over the short time interval ( , )t t dt+ , if the otherwise second-
best optimal resource allocation contains uninternalized positional externalities. As in the 
analogous measure of welfare change derived in the simpler representative-agent model in 
Section 3, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (43) – which adjusts the 
conventional genuine saving measure under externalities – is forward looking. To be able to 
write equation (43) in exactly the same format as its first-best counterpart in equation (13), 
i.e., as the product of the real welfare change and the marginal utility of consumption, we 
would need an additional, and simplifying, assumption: we must assume that the relative 
wage rate, 1 21 2 1 2 1 2/ ( , , ) / ( , , )t t t t t t t t tw w f k f kφ = =      , is independent of tk  for all t (which it 
is for standard constant returns to scale production functions such as the Cobb-Douglas or 
CES). In this case, the shadow price of capital takes the simple form 
0 0
exp( )
t
t r d ttl l t θ= − +∫  
and equation (43) can be rewritten as 
 0 0 0 0 0exp( )t t t s s t s
t
W k R c dsl
∞
−
 
= + Λ − 
 
∫  .                 (44) 
The only difference between equations (13) and (44) is that the partial instantaneous welfare 
effect of increased reference consumption is no longer necessarily negative here, i.e., tΛ  can 
be either positive or negative, while it would be unambiguously negative in a first-best setting 
where the self-selection constraint does not bind (in which case 0ptη =  and 0t tαΛ = − <  for 
all t). As such, the second term on the right-hand side of equation (44) reflects not only the 
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pure welfare cost of the positional externality (as represented by the average degree of 
positionality), but also that an increase in this externality may either facilitate or hinder 
redistribution. 
To be more specific, if the low type is always more positional than the mimicker such that 
1 2ˆt tα α>  for all t, then 0tΛ <  for all t and equation (44) is interpretable in the same general 
way as the measure of welfare change in the representative-agent model in equation (13). 
However, if the mimicker is more positional than the low type such that 2 1ˆt tα α>  during a 
certain time interval 1 2( , )t t t∈ , and if this difference in degrees of positionality is sufficiently 
large, we cannot rule out that tΛ  is positive during this time interval. As a consequence, an 
increase of the reference measure tc  through increased consumption along the equilibrium 
path may actually be associated with a net social benefit (instead of cost), meaning that the 
conventional measure of genuine saving underestimates (instead of overestimates) the change 
in social welfare. 
What determines differences in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the 
low type? In our (quite general) model where the utility functions are allowed to differ 
between types, these positionality differences may arise for a variety of reasons. To simplify 
the interpretation, consider the special case where all individuals share a common utility 
function such that the functions ( )iu ⋅  and ( )iu ⋅  are the same for both types. Then, the only 
difference between the mimicker and the low type is that the mimicker spends more time on 
leisure. Therefore 2 1ˆ ( )t tα α> <  if the degree of positionality increases (decreases) with the use 
of leisure. Although this information is not directly observable, it is (at least in principle) 
recoverable via econometric methods. 
Another interesting – and practically relevant – observation is that the first term on the 
right-hand side of equations (43) and (44), t tkl  , is less informative here than in the context of 
equation (13). As in equation (13) and for the same reason, 0t tkl >  does not necessarily 
indicate welfare improvement. However, and contrary to equation (13), even if we assume 
that tc  increases along the equilibrium path, we can no longer use t tkl   for a one-sided test of 
local unsustainable development as 0t tkl <  does not imply that the right-hand side of 
equation (43) is negative. 
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7. Numerical Illustration 
In previous sections, we have shown that conventional measures of genuine saving do not 
generally constitute valid measures of welfare change, and we have also derived exact welfare 
change measures for unregulated economies. While this is important per se, it is also 
important to be able to say something about likely orders of magnitude and whether or not the 
modifications are likely to be similar between countries in percentage terms. In this section 
we illustrate first that the discrepancies between measures of genuine saving and welfare 
change are indeed likely to be substantial and second that these modifications may also differ 
greatly between countries.   
Our numerical simulation example is based on data for Sweden and the U.S., and serves to 
provide a rough estimate of the right-hand side of equation (44), i.e., the genuine saving 
adjusted for uninternalized positional externalities. To be able to manage this task without a 
lengthy numerical extension of the paper, we make four additional, simplifying assumptions: 
(i) all consumers share a common utility function where leisure is weakly separable from the 
other goods, (ii) the positionality degree is constant over time for all consumers, (iii) the 
interest rate is constant over time, and (iv) the average consumption in the economy can be 
approximated by a consumption function with a constant growth rate. 
Assumption (i) means that the mimicker and the mimicked agent are equally positional, 
i.e., 2 1ˆt tα α= , implying, in turn, that the second term on the right-hand side of equation (42) 
vanishes.21 This does not in itself require that all individuals are equally positional; the model 
is still consistent with differences in positional concerns among types. Taken together, 
assumptions (i) and (ii) imply t tα αΛ = − = −  for all t,
22 while assumption (iii) implies tr r=  
for all t. Finally, assumption (iv) is consistent with models used in literature on endogenous 
growth and implies that we can write the average consumption at any time s t>  as 
 ( )s ts tc c e
κ −= ,                   (45) 
where κ  is the growth rate. 
                                                          
21 To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence available here, which suggests that the relationship between 
the degree of consumption positionality and the use of leisure is a relevant issue for future research. Therefore, 
lack of empirical evidence on this relationship motivates us to assume leisure separability. 
22 Assumption (ii) can alternatively be replaced with a functional form assumption on the instantaneous utility 
function, such that the degree of positionality is constant over time; see, e.g., Ljunqvist and Uhlig (2000). 
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Our aim is now to operationalize the welfare change measure for the unregulated economy 
given in equation (44). As such, the calculations below presuppose that the positional 
externality is uninternalized, while all other aspects of public policy are optimally chosen 
conditional on the level of reference consumption. By using assumptions (i)-(iv), equation 
(44) can be written in the following convenient way:23 
 
 
1 exp( )t t s s t s
t t
t t
GS
ME
W k R c ds
k c
r
l
ακ
κ
∞
−= + Λ −
= −
−
∫ 

.                 (46) 
The left-hand side of equation (46) is a money-metrics version of the welfare change (through 
division by the marginal utility of consumption), while the right-hand side decomposes this 
into the conventional genuine saving (GS) and the value of the marginal externality (ME). In 
particular, note that the higher the average degree of positionality, α , or the higher the 
consumption growth rate, κ , ceteris paribus, the larger the marginal externality will be, and 
the more the conventional measure of genuine saving will overestimate the welfare change. 
To estimate equation (46), we use data from Sweden and the U.S. for the period 1990-
2012. Our point of departure is the World Bank measure of adjusted net saving, which we 
interpret as a conventional indicator of genuine saving that does not reflect any positional 
externalities (i.e., our GS above).24 We shall then examine how this measure ought to be 
modified in response to uninternalized positional externalities through the second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (46). The raw data contains information on the adjusted net 
saving, aggregate private consumption, total population, and the GDP deflator, allowing us to 
calculate both the conventional genuine saving and the value of the marginal externality in 
                                                          
23 Since assumption (i) eliminates any difference in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low 
type, the second line of equation (46) would also follow from the welfare change measure of the representative-
agent model given in equation (13). 
24 The adjusted net saving is defined as the net national savings plus education expenditure minus an 
estimated value of energy depletion, mineral depletion, forest depletion, carbon dioxide emissions, and 
particulate emissions damage. We realize, of course, that this definition captures several aspects not addressed 
above (mainly referring to valuation of human capital and environmental capital). Yet, our more narrow 
definition of net investment is not important here, since adding investments in human and environmental capital 
does not affect any of the qualitative results derived above. In fact, we showed in Section 5 that a straightforward 
extension of the model would allow us to reinterpret k  to reflect a broader capital concept. 
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real per capita terms.25 We use per capita variables to avoid possible welfare consequences of 
population size and growth (which we have abstracted from above). The average degree of 
positionality is assumed to be in the interval 0.2-0.4, which is thus a conservative assumption 
given the empirical research discussed in the introduction. The calculations are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 HERE 
 
The numbers in Table 1 should be seen for what they are, i.e., the outcome of a 
computational example and not the result of empirical research. With this reservation in mind, 
we would nevertheless like to emphasize three important insights from the table. First, the 
value of the marginal externality is substantial. Note that this is so despite our quite 
conservative estimates of the average degree of positionality, α . Indeed, even based on the 
lower-bound estimate of 0.2, we obtain quite large values of the marginal externality. This 
suggests that the conventional measure of genuine saving may largely overestimate the true 
welfare change. Second, the conventional measure of genuine saving may give incorrect 
qualitative information as to whether the development is locally sustainable. For several 
combinations of growth rate, interest rate, and average degree of positionality, GS-ME is less 
than zero despite that GS is positive. Third, this discrepancy will generally not be similar 
between countries. In our case, the discrepancy is considerably larger for the U.S. than for 
Sweden, as the conventional genuine saving is smaller and the per capita consumption larger 
in the U.S. than in Sweden. 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper deals with the measurement of welfare change by developing an analogue to 
genuine saving in an economy where the consumers are positional. Recent empirical evidence 
shows that people derive utility from their own consumption relative to that of referent others, 
and also that the negative externalities of this wasteful consumption might be substantial, 
implying that measures of social savings ought to be modified accordingly. This is further 
emphasized by the now widely accepted role that genuine saving plays as an indicator of local 
sustainable development. 
                                                          
25 These data are from the database World Development Indicators of the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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In the context of first-best representative-agent economies, earlier research shows that the 
genuine saving is an exact indicator of welfare change and also interpretable as an exact 
indicator of local sustainable development. We show that this result carries over to a second-
best economy based on asymmetric information about individual productivity and a binding 
self-selection constraint, in the sense that the change in social welfare (measured by a general 
social welfare function) over a short time interval is exactly equal to the genuine saving. We 
also show how the value of public investment affects genuine saving and derive a simple 
accounting price that applies irrespective of whether or not the positional externalities have 
become internalized. 
However, in the arguably more interesting case where the positional externality has not 
become fully internalized, the equality between welfare change and genuine saving no longer 
applies, and we show how this discrepancy depends on the degrees of positionality (i.e., 
measures used in empirical literature to indicate the extent to which relative consumption 
matters for individual well-being). In a representative-agent model, and if the consumption 
increases along the general equilibrium path (which the ideas of a positional arms race may 
suggest), uninternalized positional externalities typically imply that the genuine saving 
overestimates the change in social welfare. As such, negative genuine saving can still be used 
as an indicator of local unsustainable development, i.e., negative genuine saving implies that 
the social welfare declines.  
In an economy with productivity differences and asymmetric information, the conventional 
measure of genuine saving is even less informative if the positional externalities are not 
internalized. If this is the case, negative genuine saving can no longer be used as an indicator 
of local unsustainable development. We also demonstrate in a numerical exercise that the 
modifications are likely to be substantial and that they are likely to differ between countries to 
a large extent. 
Future research may take several possible directions. First, recent empirical evidence 
shows that individuals do not only compare their own consumption with that of other 
domestic residents, they also engage in between-country comparisons (Becchetti et al., 2013). 
This suggests to us that a multi-country framework might be useful in future research on 
genuine saving. We conjecture that genuine saving is less useful as an indicator of welfare 
change at the national level in such a setting. Second, although empirical evidence shows that 
people are concerned with their relative consumption, people are also found to have an 
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aversion against too much inequality. This suggests that it might be relevant to extend the 
analysis of genuine saving by allowing also for other types of social comparisons. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
The Benchmark Model 
The value function is given by 
 ( )( , , ) s tt s s s
t
V c z c e dsθu
∞
− −= ∫ .                (A1) 
Differentiating equation (A1) with respect to t gives 
 ( , , )t t t t tV V c z cθ u= − .                 (A2) 
To write equation (A2) in the format of equation (10) or (13), we must find an expression for 
tVθ . 
Proof of Observation 1 
Differentiating the present value Hamiltonian in equation (5) with respect to time and 
using t tc c=  gives 
 ( , , )
p p p p p
tt t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t
dH H H H H
c z c e c l k
dt c l k
θθ u l
l
− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − + + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   .              (A3) 
The first term on the right-hand side is the direct effect of time through the utility discount 
factor, while the remaining three terms represent indirect effects of time through the control, 
state, and costate variables. Equations (5), (6a), (6b), and (6c) imply 
/ / 0p pt t t tH c H l∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = , /
p
t t tH kl = −∂ ∂ , and /
p
t t tH kl∂ ∂ =  , and equation (A3) reduces to 
 ( , , )
p
tt
t t t
dH
c z c e
dt
θθ u −= − .                 (A4) 
Solving equation (A4) forward subject to the transversality condition lim 0pt tH→∞ =  implies 
 ( , , ) s ps s s t
t
c z c e ds Hθθ u
∞
− =∫ .                (A5) 
Multiplying both sides of equation (A5) by teθ  gives Weitzman’s (1976) welfare measure 
t tV Hθ = . Substituting into equation (A2) and using ( , , )t t t t t tH c z c ku l= +   gives equation 
(10). 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Differentiating equation (5) totally with respect to time, while treating tc  as a separate 
variable, we can rewrite equation (A3) as 
                   ( , , )
p p p p p p
tt t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
dH H H H H H
c z c e c l k c
dt c l k c
θθ u l
l
− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − + + + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    .        (A6) 
Then, by using equations (6b), (6c), and (7), equation (A6) simplifies to 
 ( , , )
p
t tt
t t t t t t
dH
c z c e e c
dt
θ θθ u l α− −= − −  ,                (A7) 
where we have used /p t t p tt t c t c t t t tH c e e e
θ θ θu α u α l α l− −∂ ∂ = = − = − = − . Solving equation 
(A7) forward subject to lim 0pt tH→∞ = , and multiplying by 
teθ  to convert into current value, 
gives 
 ( )s tt t s s s
t
V H c e dsθθ l α
∞
− −= − ∫  .                (A8) 
Substitute equation (A8) into equation (A2) and use ( , , )t t t t t tH c z c ku l= +   
 ( )s tt t t s s s
t
V k c e dsθl l α
∞
− −= − ∫  .                (A9) 
Using / exp( ( ))
s
s t t
r d s ttl l t θ= − + −∫ , and substituting into equation (A9), gives equation 
(13). 
 
The Model with Heterogeneous Consumers 
The social welfare function is given by 
 ( )1 1 2 2 ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s tt s s s s s s
t
W c z c c z c e dsθω u u
∞
− −= ∫ .             (A10) 
The welfare change measure can then be written as 
 ( )1 1 2 2( , , ), ( , , )t t s s s s s sW W c z c c z cθ ω u u= − .              (A11) 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Differentiating the present value Lagrangean in equation (34) with respect to time, and 
using that the first-order conditions in equations (35a)-(35e) are fulfilled, gives 
 ( )1 1 2 2( , , ), ( , , )
p
tt
t t t t t t
dL
c z c c z c e
dt
θθ ω u u −= − .             (A12) 
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By solving equation (A12) in the same way as we solved equation (A4) above, and using that 
p p
t tL H= , the proof follows by analogy to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Differentiating the present value Lagrangean in equation (34) with respect to time, while 
using the first-order conditions in equations (35c), (35d), (35e), (39a), and (39b), gives 
 ( )1 1 2 2( , , ), ( , , )
p
t tt
t t t t t t t t t
dL
c z c c z c e e c
dt
θ θθ ω u u l− −= − + Λ  ,           (A13) 
where we have used /p p tt t t t t tL c e
θl l −∂ ∂ = Λ = Λ . Solving equation (A13) forward subject to 
the transversality condition lim 0pt tH→∞ = , using 
p p
t tL H= , and multiplying by 
te θ−  to 
convert into current value terms, gives 
 ( )1 1 2 2 ( ) ( )( , , ), ( , , ) s t s ts s s s s s t s s s
t t
c z c c z c e ds H c e dsθ θθ ω u u l
∞ ∞
− − − −= + Λ∫ ∫  .           (A14) 
Substituting into equation (A11) and using ( )1 2,t t t t tH U U kω l= +   gives equation (43). 
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Table 1 A computation example  
              Sweden   U.S. 
(i) 0.01 and 0.03rκ = =  
GS         ME          GS-ME      GS            ME            GS-ME 
0.2α =  6.26       1.81          4.45                          3.84          2.64              1,20 
0.4α =  6.26       3.61          2.65                          3.84          5.27               -1.43             
(ii) 0.02 and 0.04rκ = =  
GS         ME          GS-ME      GS            ME            GS-ME 
0.2α =  6.26       3.61            2.65                         3.84          5.27               -1.43 
0.4α =  6.26       7.23          -0.97                         3.84        10.55              -6.71              
Note: All numbers are given in thousands of U.S. dollars at the 2005 price level. To avoid yearly fluctuations, 
the calculations are based on mean values for the genuine saving per capita and aggregate consumption per 
capita over the period 1990-2012. 
 
 
 
